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I. INTRODUCTION
The permissibility of ex parte communications' by interested per-
sons during "off-the-record ' 2 agency proceedings has been the subject
of considerable controversy in recent years. In the past, Congress, the
courts, and governmental agencies have agreed that the justifications
for prohibiting ex parte communications applied only to adjudicatory
proceedings governed by sections 554, 556, and 557 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act3 or to other agency proceedings involving the "reso-
lution of conflicting private claims to a valuable privilege."' 4 In 1977,
1. Ex parte communications, as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act, include "oral
or written communication[s] not on the public record with respect to which reasonable prior notice
to all parties is not given, . . . [but do not include] requests for status reports. . . " 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(14) (1976). The Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1976), narrowed this
definition somewhat by prohibiting only those ex parte communications that are "relevant to the
merits." 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(A)-(B) (1976).
In practice ex parte communications take a variety of forms. See, e.g., Hercules Inc. v. EPA,
598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (intra-agency discussions between the EPA's chiefjudicial officer and
agency experts regarding the record); United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584
F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (receipt of additional information by the Commission staff from one
party and two foreign governments after the close of the notice and comment period); Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (private meetings between represen-
tative of the broadcast industry and Chairman of the FCC); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567
F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (private meetings between FCC Commissioner and industry representatives to
the exclusion of public interest intervenors, and indirect ex parte communications through con-
gressional pressure), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns
v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (public threats by several congressmen to withhold
agency appropriations), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
2. As used here, the term "off-the-record" proceeding means any agency decisionmaking
process that is not an adjudication or a rulemaking proceeding required to be held "on-the-rec-
ord" under the Administrative Procedure Act.
3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1976). The original Administrative Procedure Act prohibited
ex parte contacts during any adjudication proceeding. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970). In addition, sec-
tion 556(e) effectively barred agency decisionmakers from receiving ex parte communications dur-
ing formal rulemaking proceedings by stating that the hearing transcript and written submissions
from the parties should constitute "the exclusive record for decision." See 46 GEO. WASr. L.
REv. 442, 448 n.42 (1978). Neither of these provisions, however, applied to "the agency or a
member or members of the body comprising the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(C) (1970).
Congress clarified the law governing ex parte communications in the Government in the Sun-
shine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1246 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1976)). This
1976 amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act expressly prohibited ex parte communica-
tions on the merits in all formal agency proceedings between an interested person and any agency
official "who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional process." 5 U.S.C.
§ 557(d)(1)(A) (1976). If a communication is received by the agency, it must be summarized and
placed in the public record of the proceeding. Id. § 557(d)(l)(C).
4. Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
The underlying rationale of the Sangamon Valley case was that undisclosed ex parte communica-
tions are permissible in informal rulemakings as long as the proceeding does not involve a factual
dispute between distinct parties over a valuable privilege. This principle governed the legality of
ex parte communications in off-the-record proceedings for almost two decades. For a more com-
plete discussion of Sangamon Valley, see text accompanying notes 57-61 infra.
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however, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia questioned
these assumptions in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC5 and ordered a
comprehensive prohibition against ex parte communications on the
merits in all rulemaking proceedings. Although the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Actionfor Children's Television v. FCC6 retreated from an
absolute ban on ex parte communications and reasserted a case-by-case
approach based on traditional standards, distinctions between the two
cases ensured the continuing vitality of the Home Box Office rule.7
Three 1978 decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit further
demonstrated the willingness of the court to scrutinize off-the-record
agency proceedings for improper ex parte communications.8 First, in
United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commission,9 the court
held that the Federal Maritime Commission improperly relied on un-
disclosed ex parte communications in a quasi-adjudicatory proceeding
that approved an amendment to a joint service agreement between two
ocean carriers and granted an exemption from the antitrust laws. The
court reasoned that informal agency adjudications should be governed
5. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
6. 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
7. In Home Box Office, the Federal Communications Commission had developed a rule
that "conferred preferential advantages on vast segments of the broadcast industry to the detri-
ment of other competing business interests," 567 F.2d at 62 (MacKinnon, J., concurring specially),
and was thus at least arguably within the scope of the Sangamon Valley doctrine. See note 4
supra. The Actionfor Children's Television case is distinguishable on three grounds. First, the
proceeding in Actionfor Children's Television did not result in the formulation of a rule. Second,
there was no indication that the Federal Communications Commission gave any of the interested
parties in Actionfor Children's Television any advantages not shared by all. Third, the Actionfor
Children's Television proceeding was classic informal rulemaking involving the formulation of
policy revisions of general applicability.
8. In still another case, the District of Columbia District Court also held that undisclosed ex
parte communications were improper in off-the-record agency proceedings. Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C. 1978). In Blum the district court remanded a
final order of the Environmental Protection Agency granting the State of Mississippi an exemp-
tion from the registration requirements of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1976). The court held that the Agency had violated section 553 of the
Administrative Procedure Act by receiving ex parte communications from interested parties after
the formal closing of the record in an informal rulemaking proceeding. Expressly applying Home
Box Office, Actionfor Children's Television, and United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978), to the proceeding before it, the court remarked: "Where
... the information received ex parte is not generated internally by the agency, bears directly on
highly complex technical issues, and will probably have some effect on the final outcome, it should
be revealed for public comment before the agency reaches its decision." 458 F. Supp. at 660.
In a number of other circuit court cases ex parte communications were not held to be im-
proper because an examination of the facts demonstrated that the parties were not prejudiced in
any way. See Rogers Radio Communication Servs., Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1225, 1233-34 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 589 F.2d 647, 654 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Western Union
Int'l, Inc. v. FCC, 568 F.2d 1012, 1019 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978).
9. 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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by the same standards applied to notice and comment rulemaking in
Home Box Office 0 and advanced three bases for holding that ex parte
communications were illegal: (1) the communications foreclosed effec-
tive judicial review of the agency's final decision under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act's "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review; (2)
the communications violated the principles of fairness inherent in con-
stitutional due process; and (3) the communications were inconsistent
with the public's right under the Shipping Act of 19161 to meaningful
participation in the Federal Maritime Commission's decisionmaking
process through a "hearing" prior to agency action.' 2
In National Small Shioments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. ICC, t3 the
District of Columbia Circuit used similar reasoning in holding that the
Interstate Commerce Commission's receipt of ex parte communications
in an "informal rulemaking" proceeding necessitated a full remand to
the agency. Even though the focus of the proceeding was on the "valid-
ity of certain rate-making principles. . . that future rate-making would
depend oh,"' 4 rather than on the reasonableness of previously enacted
rates, the court argued that "the adjudication contemplated in this case
lies near the core described by the [ex parte communications] doctrine's
rationales."15
Finally, in Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 16 the court declined to prohibit
undisclosed intra-agency staff contacts with agency decisionmakers in a
notice and comment rulemaking proceeding held prior to the Home
Box Office decision. The court left open the possibility that the princi-
ples underlying Home Box Office would require the prohibition of in-
tra-agency contacts in other cases.' 7
10. Id. at 539-40.
11. 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1976).
12. 584 F.2d at 540-41.
13. 590 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
14. Id. at 347.
15. Id. at 350.
16. 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
17. Id. at 126. The court upheld the EPA's decision in this particular context because
the contacts only concerned assistance in understanding the record, EPA proceeded in
good faith, section 554(d) is clearly inapplicable, Home Box Office does not apply retro-
actively, and the particular statutory and administrative context made rapid action by
EPA necessary to carry out congressional mandates for the protection of public healt
and the environment.
Id. at 127. The District of Columbia Circuit's position on intra-agency ex parte communications
remains unclear in light of the Hercules decision and the court's recent opinion in Association of
Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 1979-2 Trade Cas. 62,950, at 79,394 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In the
NationalAdverisers case the court held that it would be "inappropriate if not impossible to decide
whether the proscription on exparte contacts outlined in Home Box Office and other cases," IM. at
79,399, applied to contacts between FTC Commissioners ahid their general staff when the nature
of the contacts was a matter of speculation and the case was currently unsuitable for judicial
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Despite the District of Columbia Circuit's firm commitment to a
strict ex parte communications doctrine, the debate' 8 surrounding the
subject is likely to continue for several reasons. First, the Supreme
Court expressly disapproved of any judicially imposed procedural in-
novations in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. 19 Second, congressional leaders and the
Administration declined to restrict ex parte communications in off-the-
record proceedings in the proposed comprehensive "Regulation Re-
form Act of 1979."20 Third, executive and independent regulatory
agencies have reacted cautiously to the District of Columbia Circuit's
policy by proposing or adopting rules that impose a variety of restric-
tions on ex parte communications with their members. 21
This Article will examine the validity of the District of Columbia
Circuit's approach to ex parte communications in off-the-record pro-
ceedings. It begins with a theoretical discussion of the compatability of
ex parte communications with the judicial and legislative models of
resolution. Id. at 79,399-400. Further, Judge Wright stated in a concurring opinion that a prohi-
bition of possible ex parte communications in a trade regulation rulemaking on children's adver-
tising was unjustified despite appellant's attempt to characterize the proceeding as an adjudication
or adversarial process because the law in the circuit was "unsettled" on the matter. Id. at 79,405-
06, (Wright, J., concurring in the result). Compare Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564
F.2d 458, 471 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1977) with Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9,55 (D.C. Cir.),
cer-. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
18. Scholars and law review commentators have discussed the holdings of Home Box Office
and 4ctiou for Children'r Television in great detail. See Bruff, Presidential Power andAdministra-
tive Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 500-06 (1979); Nathanson; Comment, ARIZ. ST. L.J.; Note, Ex
Parte Contacts in Informal Julemaking, 65 CAL. L. REV. 1315 (1977); Note, Ex Parte Contacts in
InformalRulemaking. Home Box Office and Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 57 NaB. L.
Rv. 843 (1978); 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV., supra note 3.
19. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
20. S. 755, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S3337 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1979).
21. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 300.2-3 (1978) (CAB) (prohibiting substantive communications re-
garding a public proceeding between any concerned Board employee and any nonemployee, and
requiring disclosure on the public record); 16 C.F.R. § 1.18(c) (1978) (FTC) (prohibiting ex parte
communications and requiring disclosure of their contents whenever they occur in hybrid
rulemaking under the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 56, 57a-57c, 2301-2312
(1976)); 16 C.F.R. § 1012.2(g) (1978) (CPSC) (requiring all agency "meetings" to be open to the
public with advance notice and requiring all communications with the agency in rulemaking pro-
ceedings to be summarized and placed on the public file). For a detailed discussion of these rules
and other agency ex parte guidelines, see Comment, Apuz. ST. LJ. 87-94.
The Administrative Conference urged that agencies log all ex parte communications and
place them in a file for public inspection. 1 C.F.R. § 305.77-3 (1978). See also 10 C.F.R. § 204
(1978) (FEA); DOT Order 2100.2, Oct. 5, 1970. In contrast, the Federal Communications Com-
mission reacted conservatively to Home Box Office and Action for Children's Television, refusing
to prohibit ex parte communications in any proceeding other than those of a quasi-adjudicatory
nature and experimenting with procedures for the disclosure of communications in other proceed-
ings. This interim policy was later withdrawn because of adverse public comment. 43 Fed. Reg.
27,868 (1978).
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decisionmaking that underlie the administrative system. The Article
argues that although a judicial model of decisionmaking requires the
prohibition of ex parte communications, this model should rarely be
applied to off-the-record agency proceedings due to the distinctive pur-
poses of administrative action.22 Following this overview of the prob-
lem, the Article reviews the court's changing approach to ex parte
communications in off-the-record proceedings, identifying the analyti-
cal themes and distinctions that have been relied upon by the court to
determine the resolution of particular cases. 23
The focus of the Article then shifts to the statutory and constitu-
tional arguments offered by the District of Columbia Circuit to justify
its approach to ex parte communications. 24 First, the Article analyzes
the argument that ex parte communications conflict with implied con-
gressional and Administration policies, 25 the public's right to partici-
pate in agency decisionmaking under the Administrative Procedure Act
and various governing statutes, 26 and the court's need to preserve effec-
tive judicial review of agency decisions.27 Acknowledging the legiti-
macy of some of the court's concerns, the Article nevertheless
concludes that the court should refrain from imposing an additional
procedural safeguard on off-the-record agency proceedings because the
relevant statutory provisions do not require the prohibition or disclo-
sure of ex parte communications.28 Finally, the Article considers the
court's contention that ex parte communications are inherently unfair
and violative of due process. 29 Rejecting this constitutional theory, the
Article argues that agencies are not limited by due process in exercising
their discretion to receive ex parte communications without-disclosure
in off-the-record proceedings, unless established judicial doctrines indi-
cate that the proceeding is sufficiently adjudicative to invoke additional
constitutional protection.
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
A. Judicial and Legislative Models of Decisionmaking.
The administrative process has been defined as a collection of the
law-making and law-deciding powers that are exercised by government
22. See notes 30-47 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 48-84 infra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 85-237 infra and accompanying text.
25. See notes 85-113 infra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 114-44 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 145-214 infra and accompanying text.
28. See notes 187-214 infra and accompanying text.
29. See notes 215-37 infra and accompanying text.
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entities within the executive branch instead of by the legislature or the
court system. 30 Although administrative decisionmaking is intended to
be unique, the standards and practices of judicial and legislative deci-
sionmaking often provide the parameters within which administrative
agencies operate.
The application of judicial and legislative models of decisionmak-
ing to the issue of ex parte communications provides a theoretical
framework for determining the types of administrative proceedings in
which ex parte communications should be prohibited. If an agency
proceeding is characterized primarily as a judicial inquiry, then the ap-
plicability of a judicial model of decisionmaking would require the
prohibition and disclosure of all ex parte communications. Ex parte
communications are unquestionably incompatible with the concept of a
fair trial-type hearing.31
In contrast, when an agency proceeding is primarily a legislative
process, ex parte communications should not be prohibited. Congress-
men have traditionally been free to seek information and to provide
informal access to constituents and lobbyists. Rather than diminishing
the importance of public discussion of a bill in open committee hear-
ings and floor debate, these additional information sources supplement
a congressman's knowledge, thereby increasing the likelihood of an
informed and reasoned decision. The same principle may apply to
discretionary private discussions and conferences by agency deci-
sionmakers engaged in rulemaking or other informal actions. Agency
commissioners must have the flexibility to gather knowledge regarding
questions before the regulatory agency.32 As one former commissioner
remarked:
A member of a regulatory agency as they [sic] are constituted today
cannot possibly decide a case solely on the record before him. A
man who has the duty of promoting the welfare of an industry must
learn all he can about that industry. He must read books, magazines,
reports. He must see the industry firsthand as much as possible. He
must talk with executives and employees involved in all phases of
industry operations, he must talk with the public, with customers and
patrons of the industry. He must as best as he can inform himself of
30. See L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 10 (1976).
31. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(4) & Commentary, Hearings on
H.R 10315 & 9868 Before the House Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 248
(1975) (noting that finding an advocate for ex parte communications in formal trial-type proceed-
ings is like "finding an advocate for sin").
32. See, e.g., I C.F.R. § 305.77-3 (1978) (Administrative Conference Recommendation No.
77-3); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 6:18, at 537 (1976); Peck, Regulation
and Control of Ex Parte Communications with Administrative Agencies, 76 HARV. L. RaV. 233
(1962).
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the impact of the industry's operations on our national economy and
our national defense.33
This analysis indicates that no theoretical foundation exists for a
comprehensive ban on ex parte communications in all agency proceed-
ings. If, regardless of the character of the proceedings, administrative
decisionmakers are forced to assume the posture of judges rather than
specialized experts, the peculiar advantages of the administrative sys-
tem are diminished and original congressional justifications for dele-
gating judicial and legislative powers to the agencies are undermined.34
The problem, therefore, is to identify the administrative proceedings
that merit the application of a judicial model.35
The Administrative Procedure Act does not address the issue of
appropriate administrative procedures in terms of separate legislative
and judicial functions. Instead, the Act creates two categories of proce-
dural requirements for administrative actions. The trial-type hearing
provisions of sections 554, 556, and 55736 apply to agency adjudications
and to any rulemaking proceeding in which the governing statute speci-
fies that rules be promulgated "on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing . . . . 37 In contrast, the legislative-type notice and
comment provisions of section 553 apply to all rulemaking proceedings
that are not required to be held "on the record" and to other informal
agency actions.38
33. Hearings on S. Res. 234 Before the Subcomm on Administraive Practice and Procedure of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 239 (1960) (statement of former CAB
Commissioner Louis Hector).
34. Although the problem of agency deference to the interests of regulated industries is well
established, see Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 53 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
829 (1977), there is a point at which the public must rely upon trust if the administrative system
is to continue functioning effectively and attracting competent individuals to public scrvice posi-
tions.
35. One scholar phrased the issue as follows: "No one will quarrel with the position that
improper ex parte communications should be prohibited. But no one will contend that all ex parte
communications are improper. So the real question is. . .where to draw the line." Stone, Ex
Pare Communications: The Harris Bill, the CAB, and the Dilemma of Where to Draw the Line, 13
AD. L. REv. 141, 141 (1960) (emphasis in original).
36. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1976). Agency hearings governed by these provisions are simi-
lar to judicial proceedings. Opposing parties, often a private firm and the agency trial staff, create
a formal record through an adversary process before an administrative law judge or an agency
member. As long as the agency does not decide to adopt procedures for the submission of written
evidence, the parties are entitled to present their views by oral or documentary evidence, to rebut
evidence, and to conduct cross-examination.
37. Id. § 554(a).
38. Id. § 553. Proceedings subject to the notice and comment requirements of section 553
must follow three main steps. First, the agency must publish a general notice of the proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register, describing the terms of the rule, its legal foundations, and the
subjects and issues involved. Second, following the notice, the agency must allow interested per-
sons to participate in the rulemaking through the submission of written data, views, or arguments.
[Vol. 1980:65
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These statutory provisions, in combination with the Act's broad
definition of an agency rule,39 create a false dichotomy that allows ad-
ministrative decisions involving disputed factual and legal issues be-
tween distinct parties to be governed by the same procedures applicable
to decisions setting forth broad policy guidelines. This confusion is il-
lustrated by examining two different sorts of proceedings40 that the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act would place in the same "off-the-record"
category. For example, when an agency is engaged in traditional infor-
mal notice and comment rulemaking, the issues are complex and nu-
merous, the parties are diverse and unalignable, and the agency's
nonaccusatory decision requires the discretionary implementation of
statutory policy and an assessment of future consequences. 4' This type
of off-the-record proceeding clearly is unsuited to trial-type procedures,
since it involves the weighing of "legislative facts."' 42 Although infor-
mal administrative rulemaking is not directly analogous to legisla-
tion,43 the process resembles the enactment of a statute.44 Moreover,
the purpose of these proceedings is not to try a case in an administra-
tive court, but to inform the agency and to protect affected interests
Third, the agency must consider the matter presented and publish a final rule incorporating a
general statement of the rule's basis and purpose. Id.
In practice the courts have supplemented the notice and comment provisions of section 553
by requiring additional procedures. Auerbach 16; Pedersen, The Decline of Separation of Func-
tions in Regulatory Agencies, 64 VA. L. REv. 991, 1016 (1978); Wright, The Courts and the
Rulemaking Process. The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 378 (1974). Simi-
larly, Congress has legislated procedural protections beyond those required by due process or the
Administrative Procedure Act in many regulatory statutes. See Hamilton, Proceduresfor the
Adoption of Rules of GeneralApplicability: The Needfor Procedural Innovation in Administrative
Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REv. 1276, 1277 (1972).
39. The Administrative Procedure Act defines a rule as "the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect, designed to implement, interpret,
or prescribe law or policy. ... 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976) (emphasis added).
40. The difficulty of using the definition of the Administrative Procedure Act to identify the
category of proceedings in which ex parte communications should be regulated has long been
recognized. See, e.g., Peck, supra note 32, at 239-43.
41. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT,
S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 109-10 (1941).
42. 2 K. DAVIs, TREATISE § 7:2. Davis's traditional focus on the nature of the facts at issue in
a proceeding does not directly follow the mode of analysis used in this Article, which concentrates
on the nature of the decision made by the agency. Nevertheless, the position taken here-that
most rulemakings are primarily legislative inquiries---is firmly supported by Davis's observation
that "facts in a notice and comment proceeding should be deemed legislative facts, because their
primary purpose is to determine the content of law or policy or to decide what course of action to
take." I Id. § 6:17, at 529.
43. See Comment, ARIZ. ST. LJ. 72. The author argues that agency rulemaking differs from
legislation in that agency discretion is limited by statute, the agency is not directly accountable to
the public, and the issues under consideration often resemble adjudication.
44. 2 K. DAVIS, TREATISE § 7:2, at 4.
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against uninformed or unwise action.45 Under these circumstances, the
assumption that agency decisionmakers should refrain from ex parte
communications in section 553 rulemakings seems inappropriate. As
one court remarked:
[R]ule making is a vital part of the administrative process, particu-
larly adapted to and needful for sound evaluation of policy ... [and
it] is not to be shackled, in the absence of clear and specific Congres-
sional requirement, by importation of formalities developed for the
adjudicatory process and basically unsuited for policy rule making.4 6
In contrast, some rulemaking proceedings resolve adjudicative facts
and involve issues, parties, and interests generally associated with an
adversarial process. In these situations, the legislative model is plainly
inapplicable. For example, a Federal Communications Commission
decision regarding the licensing and assignment of a radio station
channel to a particular applicant is hardly analogous to the process of
congressional legislation. In these types of proceedings a reasonable
theoretical foundation does exist for prohibiting ex parte communica-
tions and imposing other judicial procedural innovations designed to
ensure basic fairness to the parties and meaningful public participa-
tion.47
B. Judicial Approaches to Ex Pare Communications in Off-the-
Record Proceedings.
Prior to Home Box Office, the courts generally prohibited ex parte
communications only in on-the-record proceedings and adjudica-
tions,48 as provided in the Administrative Procedure Act.49 Two early
45. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 41, at 108-09.
46. American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 629 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843
(1966).
47. Additional procedural safeguards beyond the statutory minima cannot, however, be im-
posed on administrative agencies in the absence of compelling circumstances or constitutional
requirements. See text accompanying notes 187-93 infra.
48. See, e.g., WKAT, Inc. v. FCC, 296 F.2d 375, 383 (D.C. Cir.) (secret ex parte contacts with
"an official charged with the duty of deciding contested issues upon an open record" violated basic
principles of fair play and due process in FCC comparative licensing hearing), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 841 (1961); WORZ, Inc. v. FCC, 268 F.2d 889, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (allegations of ex parte
pleas to Commissioner during television application proceeding required a remand to the agency
for an evidentiary hearing); Massachusetts Bay Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55, 66-67 (D.C.
Cir. 1958) (charges that parties seeking a television channel assignment used agents to influence a
member of the Commission require a remand to the agency for an evidentiary hearing), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 918 (1961); Jarrott v. Scrivener, 225 F. Supp. 827, 836 (D.D.C. 1964) (ex parte
contacts by State Department officials with members of a local zoning board invalidated board
order granting a variance for the construction of an embassy in a residential zone). See also
Camero v. United States, 345 F.2d 798, 799 (Ct. Cl. 1965). But see United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB,
309 F.2d 238, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (ex parte communications in a CAB adjudication awarding an
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EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS
cases, however, Morgan v. United States50 and Sangamon Valley Televi-
sion Corp. v. United States,51 have been cited as supporting the proposi-
tion that ex parte communications are improper in off-the-record
proceedings as well.52
In Morgan the Supreme Court invalidated an order of the Secre-
tary of Agriculture establishing minimum rates for the buying and sell-
ing of livestock at the Kansas City stockyards because the Secretary's
ex parte consultations with the Department's Bureau of Animal Indus-
try, which had prepared the Government's case for rate reductions, vio-
lated "fundamental requirements of fairness. ' 53 The Morgan holding
does not, however, support an extension of the ex parte prohibition to
off-the-record decisions. Although the ratemaking function can be
classified as legislative,54 the Court characterized the proceedings as a
"quasi-judicial" 55 inquiry and relied upon a judicial model of decision-
making in rejecting the Department's ex parte behavior.5 6
The doctrine announced in Sangamon Valley is similarly limited
in application. The District of Columbia Circuit held in Sangamon
airline certificate did not invalidate the agency's order because there was no showing of "corrupt
tampering with the adjudicatory process" and the communications "were placed in a public file").
49. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (1976). See also note 3 supra.
50. 304 U.S. 1 (1938) (Morgan II).
51. 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964).
52. Several other decisions have disapproved of ex parte communications in off-the-record
proceedings, but these cases were decided on the grounds that the agencies involved ignored ex-
press statutory standards. See, e.g., Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (prescription of
airline rates following ex parte meeting between CAB and airline officials without applying statu-
tory standards or holding a meaningful public hearing as required by the Federal Aviation Act);
Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (private negotia-
tion of a new programming policy with the broadcast industry by the FCC without providing
notice or an opportunity for comment violated section 553).
In D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1030 (1972), the District of Columbia Circuit suggested that where agency action is not "purely
legislative," ex parte communications with the agency are unacceptable. 459 F.2d at 1247. This
case is of limited utility, however, in establishing precedent for a ban on ex parte communications
in all off-the-record proceedings. Although the court did find that ex parte communications in the
form of threats by several congressmen to withhold appropriations had undermined the Secretary
of Transportation's decision to approve construction of a bridge, the proceeding was informal
agency action rather than rulemaking and was not subject to section 553. Moreover, the court's
decision was based not on due process or the Administrative Procedure Act, but on the Secretary's
violation of the Federal-Aid Highways Act's, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1976), requirement that the deci-
sion be based on certain specified and exclusive factors. 459 F.2d at 1237-38.
53. 304 U.S. at 18-19.
54. See Peck, supra note 32, at 242.
55. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480 (1936) (Morgan I).
56. The Court looked for guidance to the standards of conduct required of a judge during the
course of litigation. Analogizing the consultations here with ex parte communications between a
trial judge and a plaintiffs attorney, the Court had no trouble finding a violation of due process.
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1938) (Morgan II).
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Valley that an applicant's secret ex parte communications and provi-
sion of minor favors to several Federal Communications Commission
commissioners after the final date for public comment violated both
due process and Federal Communications Commission rules.5 7 The
court noted that the Commission's order approving the transfer of one
VHF and two UHF channels from Springfield, Illinois, to St. Louis,
Missouri, pursuant to an amendment of the Federal Communications
Commission Table of Television Channel Assignments, was technically
the product of informal rulemaking under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. Nevertheless, the court viewed the Commission's decision-
making process as a quasi-judicial "resolution of conflicting private
claims to a valuable privilege"5 8 and concluded that "basic fairness re-
quire[d] such a proceeding to be carried on in the open."5 9 By limiting
its holding to the channel allocation proceeding before it (an informal
rulemaking proceeding60) the court implicitly rejected the notion that
ex parte communications are generally incompatible with off-the-rec-
ord administrative decisionmaking. As one commentator noted: "The
peculiar fact situation and combination of interests and expectancies of
the parties involved in [the proceeding] had converted it into an adver-
sary proceeding to which the judicial ethic was applicable." 61
Other courts that considered the permissibility of ex parte commu-
nications in off-the-record proceedings prior to the Home Box Office
decision refused to hold them improper or to impose sanctions.62 In
Van Curler Broadcasting Corp. v. United States,63 the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit held that ex parte communications between Federal
Communications Commission commissioners and Columbia Broad-
casting System representatives during an informal rulemaking proceed-
ing on a television channel assignment were not improper. Ignoring
57. 269 F.2d at 224-25.
58. Id. at 224.
59. Id.
60. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458,475 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("Sanga-
mon. . . involve[d] informal rule making, as opposed to licensing-by-adjudication").
61. Peck, supra note 32, at 241.
62. See, eg., Sterling Nat'1 Bank v. Camp, 431 F.2d 514,516-17 (5th Cir. 1970) (comptroller's
receipt of ex parte communications from several applicants was not improper in nonadversary
proceeding); United States exrel. Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976, 982 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (adminis-
trator's receipt of ex parte communications from congressmen was not improper in "purely legis-
lative" informal rulemaking proceeding setting forth deportation guidelines); Ruppert v.
Washington, 366 F. Supp. 686, 689, 690 (D.D.C. 1973) (local zoning commission's receipt of ex
parte communications from public agencies was not improper in "quasi-legislative" administra-
tive proceeding rezoning downtown area), aJ'd, 543 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Skokie
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 400 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (N.D. Il. 1975)
(court unjustified in overturning administrative decision unaffected by bias).
63. 236 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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the quasi-judicial nature of channel assignment rulemaking,64 the court
noted that the ex parte interviews had not influenced the Commission's
subsequent channel allocation and therefore did not violate due proc-
ess.65 In fact, the contacts in question dealt with the Federal Commu-
nications Commission's general intermixture policy, which was the
subject of a pending nationwide notice and comment rulemaking pro-
ceeding. 66 As a result, Van Curler has been read as upholding the le-
gality of ex parte communications in legislative-type rulemaking
proceedings.67
The same principle was affirmed by the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit only two years after Sangamon Valley in Courtaulds (Alabama) Inc.
v. Dixon.68 The Courtaulds court held that the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's receipt of ex parte materials from an interested manufacturer did
not void a Federal Trade Commission rule generically defining a
certain fiber as rayon. The court specifically distinguished the Sanga-
mon Valley doctrine, noting that the standards applicable to quasi-judi-
cial hearings had no place in legislative rulemaking.69 More important,
however, the court stated that there was "no evidence that the Commis-
sion improperly did anything in secret or gave to any interested party
advantages not shared by all. . , ,70thereby retreating from a broad
sanction of ex parte communications in all policy rulemakings.71
Thus, the case law prior to Home Box Office indicated that the
courts would permit ex parte communications in an off-the-record pro-
ceeding unless the underlying nature of the proceeding justified the
application of the judicial ethic. If a proceeding was sufficiently adver-
sarial in character, however, the courts would disregard the Adminis-
64. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
65. 236 F.2d at 730.
66. See Peck, supra note 32, at 242; 46 GEO. WAsH. L. REv., supra note 3, at 448.
67. See 1 K. DAVIS, TREATISE § 6:18, at 535.
68. 294 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
69. Id. at 904-05 n.16. Compare Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 476
n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1977) with Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56 n.124 (D.C. Cir.), cirt.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). The Courtaulds court's characterization of the Sangamon Valley
proceeding as quasi-judicial was attacked by the District of Columbia Circuit in Home Box Office
for erroneously suggesting that channel allocation proceedings were not rulemakings. The Action
for Children's Television court interpreted the Courtaulds opinion differently, however, and stated
that the opinion merely recognized that rulemakings vary widely and are sometimes highly adju-
dicative.
70. 294 F.2d at 904-05.
71. The Home Box Office court seized upon this qualification in order to avoid expressly
overruling Courtaulds. Nevertheless, the holding in Courtaulds that ex parte communications are
not inherently impermissible in informal policy rulemaking clearly was overturned by the District
of Columbia Circuit in Home Box Office See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d
458, 476 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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trative Procedure Act's distinction between off-the-record and on-the-
record proceedings and would impose adjudicative safeguards for pol-
icy or constitutional reasons. One caveat to this rule was the court's
willingness to scrutinize the factual setting of the alleged ex parte con-
tacts in order to determine if the fairness of the proceedings was in fact
undermined.72 Thus, even if an off-the-record proceeding was adjudi-
cative in character, ex parte communications were not presumed im-
proper.
Recent decisions addressing the ex parte issue have advanced sev-
eral new justifications73 for prohibiting these communications and
reflect an increasing willingness to apply a judicial model of decision-
making to agency action. The decision of the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in Home Box Office, which applied a judicial model to all
administrative rulemaking,74 represented a substantial departure from
the court's previous approach to the ex parte issue. Subsequent cases
have, however, reinstated a case-by-case analysis of the issue, declining
to prohibit ex parte communications or to force their disclosure unless
the proceeding is functionally an adjudication.75 In Action for Chil-
dren's Television the court held that a rulemaking proceeding involving
the formulation of policy revisions of general applicability76 is not in-
herently "susceptible to poisonous ex parte influence. '77 Subsequently,
72. The Van Curler case, for example, has been read as supporting the "proposition that ex
parte contacts do not per se vitiate agency informal rulemaking action, but only do so ifit appears
from the administrative record under review that they may have materially influenced the action
ultimately taken." Id. at 476.
73. See text accompanying notes 8-17 supra.
74. 567 F.2d at 57. The rulemaking in Home Box Office involved a series of policy rules
regulating and limiting the content of programming offered by all television cablecasters and sub-
scription broadcasters. 567 F.2d at 17. With the rulemaking so characterized, there appeared to
be no basis for rejecting the "patterns of legislation" that have customarily governed notice and
comment rulemaking. 1 K. DAVIs, TREATISE § 6:18, at 534. Nevertheless, Judge MacKinnon
attempted, in a concurring opinion, to justify the court's departure from established law by char-
acterizing the proceeding as a rulemaking "involv[ing] competitive interests of great monetary
value [that] conferred preferential advantages on vast segments of the broadcast industry to the
detriment of other competing business interests." 567 F.2d at 62 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
This distinction is unconvincing. Almost all agency rules and congressional legislation allocate
portions of the public or private sector's scarce resources to one set of interests at the expense of
others. This fact alone should not be sufficient to justify the application of a judicial model of
decisionmaking.
75. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Hoffinan-LaRoche, Inc. v. Califano, 453 F. Supp. 900, 904 (D.D.C. 1978).
76. In Actionfor Children's Television, the FCC invited public comment on a series of public
interest proposals establishing general standards for advertising on children's television programs.
After the receipt of numerous comments on the proposals, the FCC met with representatives of
broadcast licensees and dismissed the rulemaking proceeding in exchange for industry efforts at
self-regulation. 564 F.2d at 462-64.
77. Id. at 477.
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the courts in United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commis-
sion78 and in National Small Shioments Traffic Conference, Inc. v.
I-C 79 held ex parte communications to be improper only after charac-
terizing the proceedings as adjudicative.80
In its recent opinions, the District of Columbia Circuit has also
continued to examine the actual effect of the alleged ex parte contacts
on the agency's decisionmaking. The Home Box Office court found a
factual basis for its ex parte prohibition in the Federal Communica-
tions Commission's failure to disclose the contents of its ex parte com-
munications, its failure to provide such informal access to all parties,
and its failure to demonstrate that the contacts did not affect the sub-
stance of the rule.8' In contrast, the court in Action for Children's Tele-
vision held that the ex parte communications did not raise "serious
questions of faimess" 82 because ex parte meetings were held with all
sides, and because the Federal Communications Commission had ra-
tional justification for its decision not to promulgate a rule.83 Several
other cases have also rejected allegations of improper ex parte commu-
nications because of the absence of a demonstrable impact on the
agency proceeding.8 4
C. Summary.
This analysis of the character of off-the-record proceedings and
relevant case law on ex parte communications suggests that to prohibit
such communications in adjudicative agency actions, but to allow them
78. 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
79. 590 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
80. The United States Lines opinion stated: "[W]hat is involved here appears quasi-adjudica-
tory in nature: the agency is required to adjudicate the rights of certain named parties to an ex-
emption from the antitrust laws." 584 F.2d at 539-40. It further suggested that the potential for
bias in a Federal Maritime Commission exemption hearing is just as great as in a rulemaking that
resolves "conflicting private claims to a valuable privilege. ... Id. at 539. Despite the court's
focus on the adversarial nature of the proceeding before it, however, the court implied that ex
parte communications are illegal in notice and comment policy rulemaking as well, thereby ac-
knowledging the continued legitimacy of the Home Box Office approach.
In National Small Shipments the court also focused on the adjudicative nature of the off-the-
record proceeding before it. The court noted "To be sure, the ex parte communications doctrine
may not operate with identical rigor in all colorably adversarial contexts, but the adjudication
contemplated in this case lies near the core described by the doctrine's rationales." 590 F.2d at
350. Thus, although the Interstate Commerce Commission tariffhearing involved was technically
an informal rulemaking, the court felt justified in imposing judicial safeguards. For a detailed
discussion of these opinions see note 144 infra.
81. 567 F.2d at 52-53.
82. 564 F.2d at 477.
83. Id. at 477-78.
84. See cases cited in note 8 supra. See also Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 123-24 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
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in off-the-record proceedings, is not theoretically inconsistent. This
analysis also suggests that the court's rejection of the legislative model
of decisionmaking that has traditionally governed agency rulemaking
and informal action is unjustified. As a result, the constitutional and
statutory justifications recently offered by the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit as a basis for the prohibition of ex parte communications must be
scrutinized.
III. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR
PROHIBITING Ex PARTE COMMUNICATIONS
Congress has not specifically prohibited ex parte communications
in off-the-record agency proceedings. 85 Consequently, courts have
looked to other provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, the
provisions of agency-governing statutes, and the Constitution to find a
basis for such a prohibition. Using this broad inquiry, the District of
Columbia Circuit has concluded that a ban on ex parte communica-
tions is supported by the Government in the Sunshine Act,86 Executive
Order 11,920,87 the judicial review provisions of section 706 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,88 the right of public participation granted
to interested persons in section 553 of the Administrative Procedure
Act,89 various "hearing" provisions of regulatory statutes,90 and the due
process clause of the United States Constitution.91 Analysis of each of
these justifications, however, demonstrates that the prohibition of ex
parte communications is not essential.
A. Implied Congressional and Executive Mandate.
Several court decisions have justified extending the ban on ex
parte communications beyond the scope of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act by invoking the open government policies expressed by Con-
gress in the Government in the Sunshine Act and by the President in
Executive Order 11,920. Although the Sunshine Act's ex parte provi-
sions do not deal with off-the-record proceedings, 92 the Home Box Of-
fice court pointed to Congress' declaration that the policy of the United
States is that "the public is entitled to the fullest practicable informa-
85. See note 3 supra.
86. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 552, 552b, 556, 557 (1976); 39 U.S.C. § 410 (1976).
87. 3 C.F.R. 121 (1977).
88. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
89. Id. § 553(c),(e).
90. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976) (FMC); 49 U.S.C. § 316(g) (1976) (ICC).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
92. See note 3 supra.
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